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ABSTRACT 
 
As the population of the MENA regionrises, virtual water import is increasing—evident bystriking food 
import figures in many of the region’s countries. This is not a new development, it has long been the case 
that MENA countries have used the import of high water content agricultural commodities as a 
mechanism for covering domestic food consumption via external water. This said, as climate induced 
global water scarcity and population driven global water demand increase simultaneously, the MENA 
region’s practice of importing water via agricultural commodities should gain increasing attention. The 
research herein quantitatively assesses MENA nations’ virtual water import determinants.Virtual water 
import stands as a function of changing regional variables including: population and economic growth, as 
well as strain on domestic water resources. While virtual water import from food commodities has 
sustained the MENA for decades, it cannot be assumed that the region will always remain a beneficiary of 
global water trade. Consequently, the region represents the geographic starting point for the global 
discussion on the sustainability of virtual water trade practices in the changing world. 
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I. Introduction 
 MENA countries constitute the world’s most water scarce geographical area (World Bank, 2008). 
These countries face a resource conundrum population growth will only make more disconcerting as it is 
estimated that by 2050per capita water availability in the region will reduce by half (Ibid). This situation 
obligates the MENA region to import many agricultural commodities—particularly those which require 
large amounts of water to produce—so as not to exhaust domestic water resources. Water scarcity forces 
countries to import water through the import of high water content agricultural products which are 
difficult to grow domestically due to strain on local water resources. This reality is evident by the fact that 
the MENA region imports 50 percent of its grain (World Bank, 2008).  The technical term for this 
practice of importing/exporting high water content agricultural goods is referred to as “virtual water 
trade” (Hoekstra and Hung, 2002). 
 While virtual water import in the MENA region has been both a wise and necessary practice for 
many years, changing global water dynamics highlight the importance of assessing the practice through a 
modern lens.The research herein assesses virtual water consumption in the MENA region in relation to 
the variables: population, income, foreign reserves, and water use—postulating that a correlation exists 
between each of these variables and virtual water import. 
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Statement of the Problem 
 The future of mankind’s relationship with water carries reason for concern. It is predicted that 
global climate change will decrease rainfall between 20 and 40 percent (World Bank, 2008) in upcoming 
years, while global agricultural water consumption will rise by 19 percent before 2050 (UNESCO, 2012). 
These external water circumstances, coupled with the region’s robust population growth—and consequent 
rising water demand—highlight the necessity of assessing virtual water consumption (both domestic and 
imported) in the MENA region. 
By and large, the focus of conversation regarding water scarcity in the MENA centers on the 
region’s minimal renewable water resources and the increasing strain these resources face each passing 
decade. The necessary consequent of this situation—the import of virtual water—is without question an 
indispensable practice. This being said, it is a practice with considerations to bear in mind. As the 
populations of countries in the MENA region rise, income and consumption capabilities increase, and the 
scarce domestic water supplies face further strain—one would expect dependency on virtual water import 
to intensify. This dependency is in essence the problem as it carries with it two negative externalities tied 
closely together: reduced food security and fiscal burden. 
The obstacle virtual water import presents to food security is straightforward: if a nation does not 
control the means of production for the food it consumes, inherently there is risk. While globalization has 
produced a world where every nation relies upon some other country for the production of at least one 
important commodity it consumes, rarely are such commodities as essential as food. What more, as has 
been mentioned, global water demand is rising while climate change is reducing rainfall, implying two 
critical points: 
Food Security 
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1) MENA countries will become increasingly unable to use their own water to grow the food they 
consume. 
2) The food commodities MENA countries rely on from abroad will be grown with ever increasing 
difficulty as competition to consume them increases. 
The link between virtual water import dependency and fiscal burden centers on the price 
fluctuating global food market. It is widely understood that food import dependency causes countries 
susceptibility to the price hikes and the economic volatility of the global food market (World Bank, 
2008). A country’s ability to import food rests on the strength of its economy. As a nation’s economy 
struggles, so does its ability to buy food imports. In a country like Egypt currently struggling substantially 
to maintain its dwindling foreign reserves, a large grocery list of annual imports complicates the matter in 
two distinct ways. First, the purchase of large amounts of food imports can drain vital fiscal reserves 
(James, 2013). Secondly, a high need for virtual water import leads to a country’s dependency on the 
price fluctuating global food market (James, 2013). For countries developing economically, as many are 
in the MENA region, being locked in to prices on such a market is not ideal. Seeing as how global food 
imports for the MENA region at large totaled 28 billion USD as recently as 2006 (IFAD, 2009), it is fair 
to already characterize the region as ‘locked in’ to foreign food exports. 
Fiscal Burden 
MENA countries cannot change their limited natural water resources. This being said, it cannot 
be assumed that the MENA region will always be able to import virtual water as easily as is currently the 
case. Nations must begin to consider ways in which they can reduce the water consumption demand of 
their societies. Discussing the significance of this issue as a global matter, the Stockholm International 
Water Institute notes that it is “essential that efforts are launched to keep the demand for water intensive 
food items within reasonable limits” (Ibid, 2005, 3). The proposed research attempts to provide a detailed 
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assessment of virtual water import for the benefit of future policy decisions by MENA region 
governments. 
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II. Literature Review 
The focus of this research is twofold: 1) to estimate virtual water import in the MENA region via 
the established methodology of matching water content estimations with import data for specific food 
commodities, and 2) to regress various forces of change in the MENA region against these virtual water 
import estimates to both assess and forecast the direction of water and food security in the region. 
 The water crisis situation in the MENA region is uncompromising as most countries are not in 
any position to attempt to reduce their virtual water import. Reducing virtual water import, assuming food 
demand remains unchanged, necessitates that the missing water be met via internal water resources. In the 
dry MENA region this isn’t feasible as the scarce water conditions are the initial reason virtual water 
import occurs so heavily to begin with. What more, it’s worth noting that in the MENA region 85 percent 
of all water use is already designated to agriculture (World Bank, 2008). In other words, use of the 
region’s strained water resources is already directed primarily to the area of concern—food production—
and yet virtual water import dependency remains high. Dependency on virtual water import and resiliency 
from it both come at a cost. 
The Virtual Water Crisis Specific to the MENA Region 
 Saying that the water resources in the MENA region are strained holds posits the following 1) the 
resources are extremely limited to begin with in relation to the amount of people they are expected to 
serve and 2) the resources are being drawn from faster than they can be replenished, if they can even be 
replenished at all. Across the region the statistics are worrying, here are some highlights: 
• Satellite images reveal that from 2003-2009 river basins for the Tigris and Euphrates stretching 
into parts of Syria, Iran, Iraq, and Iran lost 144 cubic kilometers of water—a quantity comparable 
in size to the volume of the Dead Sea (James, 2013). 
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• Sana’a is predicted to become the first capital city in the world that will lack a “viable” water 
supply (James, 2013). 
• Available renewable water resources per capita in the Arab world are the lowest globally 
(Barghouti, 2010, 2). Moreover, by 2015 it is predicted that annual available renewable water per 
capita will drop to 500 cubic meters, less than a tenth of the predicted global average of 6,000 
cubic meters (AFED, 2010, vii). 
• Climate change is predicted to drastically reduce rainfall in the Arab region—25 percent—by the 
end of the 21st century, a phenomenon that is projected to reduce rain-fed agricultural yields by 
20 percent during the same period (AFED, 2010, vii). 
• In the Arab world, increased water extraction via energized pumping from deep, underground 
water reserves has depleted non-renewable water tables leaving them permanently dry 
(Barghouti, 2010, 10) 
 
In light of this severe water scarcity crisis in the region, the question must be asked: Is the import 
of virtual water a good or bad practice? This is an important question with a nuanced answer. 
Interestingly when Tony Allan first formalized the phrase and concept of virtual water, he had in mind the 
water scarce MENA region and how the practice of virtual water import sustains its countries. Egypt, as 
an example, only has enough water to support the needs—food consumption included—of 50 million 
people (Allan, 246, 2011). With a rising population that moves further away from 50 million each year, 
Egypt’s increasing virtual water import is essential to the survival of the nation. Its significance should be 
acknowledged and appreciated, and to this extent, can be termed “good”. This being said, it cannot be 
forgotten what a nation’s virtual water import reveals: how much water from foreign sources a nation 
consumes. ‘Consume’ is not a figure of speech; the water and the food which derive from it are one in the 
Virtual Water Import: Desirable Goal or Risky Practice? 
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same. Virtual water import thus measures food dependency; a nation’s reliance on foreign water resources 
to eat each day. One can quickly conceive the risk associated with virtual water import. 
 Given that virtual water import is essential in the MENA region and cannot be reduced without 
serious implications on the overall accessibility to sustenance for the region’s countries, the distinction 
needs to be made between reducing virtual water demand and reducing virtual water import. This research 
speculates that it is within the best interest of countries in the MENA region to actively and intentionally 
reduce virtual water demand, not virtual water import. A reduction in virtual water demand should in turn 
reduce virtual water import (on a per capita basis) but the latter is not to be pursued intentionally without 
consideration of the former. If per capita virtual water demand of MENA region inhabitants reduces, this 
should translate into trade practices that result in lower per capita virtual water import. 
The theory of virtual water originated in 1998 with the research of British Professor John 
Anthony Allan. In 2008 Professor Allan was awarded the prestigious Stockholm Water Prize for his 
development of the concept (Reuters, 2008). Arguably Allan’s most notorious work on the subject 
is:Virtual Water: Tackling the Threat to Our Planet’s Most Precious Resource. In the text Allan 
addresses a variety of fundamental issues pertaining to the factors which dictate virtual water 
consumption and the overall significance of the subject. The book attempts to conceptually portrait how 
virtual water is consumed, how this consumption can be altered, and why it matters. Allan’s focus in the 
text trends towards inciting concern rather than technical explanation of how virtual water calculations are 
achieved. Allan points out in the opening pages of the book that a typical English breakfast contains 
roughly 1100 liters of water—a degree of consumption clearly beyond the means of most humans in the 
world today (Ibid, 1). Allan’s point is clear: virtual water is being consumed in massive quantities, in 
ways people don’t realize, and it is not sustainable. While Allan addresses the issue of virtual water with 
History of  theVirtual Water Concept 
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calculated concern, his tone remains optimistic. In the later chapters of the text his focus moves towards 
the means by which can directly dictate the consumption of virtual water.  
Since virtual water’s conceptual development fourteen years ago, various researchers have 
contributed with Allan in the development of its methodology, application, and policy relevance. The 
water footprint paradigm, as a contemporary method for more comprehensively evaluating water 
consumption, argues that national water use is only one part of the greater consumption equation. Under 
the water footprint model, water consumption is measured both internally and externally. Internal water 
consumption is national water use less domestic water export. External water consumption measures the 
amount of water consumed by a nation via its import of water—predominately virtual water via 
agricultural commodities (Chapagain and Hoekstra, 2007, 144). 
It goes without saying the essential reason virtual water matters is because of food and the human 
sustenance at stack. The threat of a world with less rain and more people is not a lack of drinking water, 
it’s a lack of breakfast, lunch, and dinner for people of certain income groups in specific regions of the 
world—one of  which is the MENA. Nutrition is a vital component to the sustained development of any 
country. In the case of MENA countries relying heavily on food imports, the nutrition of citizens is 
directly tied to trade policy. Countries in the MENA region have long been able to rely on trade relations 
to sustain the nutrition of citizens. 
Nutrition and Virtual Water 
One of the interesting topics in the nutrition discussion regarding virtual water import is that of 
meat. Among food consumption categories, meat leads all others in its virtual water impact: “the meat 
non-vegetarians eat is the biggest single source of water consumption in their life” (Allan, 2011, 1). The 
amount of virtual water in one kilogram of most meat products consistently hovers around 4,000-6,000 
liters (Ibid, appendix). Beef however is the highly impactful outlier with a virtual water content of 15,500 
liters per kilogram (Ibid). In light of these numbers, and a growing global population with increasing 
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desire and capacity to consume animal products as part of its diet, the UN has begun to take increasing 
alarm. In June 2010 the United Nation’s Environment Programme formed an international panel to 
address food sustainability issues, among the important statements released by the group was the 
following: 
"Impacts from agriculture are expected to increase substantially due to population growth 
increasing consumption of animal products. Unlike fossil fuels, it is difficult to look for 
alternatives: people have to eat. A substantial reduction of impacts would only be possible with a 
substantial worldwide diet change, away from animal products.” 
        (via Carus, 2010) 
While animal products do by and large provide an important source of protein, water minded 
nutritionists note that there are other ways to supplement protein in a diet. As the concern over how 
increasing global consumption of meat will affect global water reserves, simultaneously there is a health 
movement in the West to reduce meat consumption in diets, not for the sake of water, but rather health. In 
other words, the water conservation movement to restrict meat consumption in diets has an ally in a 
developing nutritional trend that argues the protein from animal and dairy products can be supplemented 
by plant products which are far better for overall health. 
Speaking on general terms, the established methodology for virtual water accounting is to 
multiple export/import trade data for a specified category of goods over a defined length of time—usually 
a year—against the water content estimations for all the goods in the category. Virtual water accounting is 
a developing pursuit in academia, marked by research of highly variant depth. This is to say virtual water 
accounting can be as simple or complex as one chooses to make it. The process, not surprisingly, becomes 
much more complicated based on the product specificity desired among the researchers. Bearing in mind 
the sub-crop processing that most agricultural goods undergo prior to export, the process of virtual 
Virtual Water Accounting 
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accounting becomes exponentially more complicated. Researchers attempt to incorporate the minute 
details of these processes into their water estimates via formulas that distribute the total water content of 
the original crop product over the various sub-products based on their value fraction of the whole 
(Chapagain and Hoekstra, 2007, 145). 
Presumably, the most definitive source on virtual water accounting is The Water Footprint 
Assessment Manual (Hoekstra et al., 2011). The manual details the scope of traditional virtual water 
accounting, what products and processes are measured, as well as the contextual circumstances that create 
country by country variance in the accounting process (Ibid). The last comprehensive assessment of 
virtual water import/export for all MENA countries was produced by leading virtual water experts 
Mekkonen and Hoekstra (2010) using observation data spanning the period 1996-2005. It was part of a 
global assessment that produced water calculations for all countries in the world in an attempt to quantify 
global water trade. Other individual country assessments have been completed on select countries of 
pertinence to this research such as: The Water Footprints of Morocco and the Netherlands: Global water 
use as a result of domestic consumption of agricultural commodities (Hoekstra and Chapagain, 2007). 
Governance is at the root of the water crisis in the MENA region—both in terms of real domestic 
water and virtual water import. 60 percent of the surface water in the Arab world originates from beyond 
the region’s borders (Dayem and Odeh, 2010, 172). Consequently, the ability of governments to form 
competent institutions to negotiate the sustained flow of this water to the region is crucial. The overall 
success of water relations between the MENA region and its neighbors depends greatly on good 
governance practices such that the best interests of the region are properly represented and diplomatically 
pursued. 
Water Institutions and Governance 
The most notorious example of this in the region is likely Egypt and its relationship with the 9 
other Nile riparian states. Egypt’s success or failure in water politics with these countries is linked closely 
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to the internal organization and competency of the country’s water diplomacy representatives. 
Additionally, in terms of best using the region’s water after it arrives, governance again is crucial. Rapid 
population growth has placed strain on water institutions in the region and deteriorated their overall 
effectiveness in water management (Dayem and Odeh, 2010, 172). So long as weak governance breeds 
poor water management, countries will remain trapped importing more virtual water than should be the 
case.  There are several types of problems facing the MENA region regarding water governance, however 
two stand out as particularly relevant: poor coordination and a failure to properly implement water 
regulations. Regarding coordination Arab countries tend to delegate water management among multiple 
ministries, tasks are frequently duplicated and the process inefficient on the whole (Majzoub, 2010, 144). 
The regulatory framework is equally problematic; laws tend to be fragmented, easily ignored by defiant 
farmers, and very often trumped by other forms of legality such as nepotism and tribalism (Ibid). 
In the MENA region, the poor are the sector of the population most burdened by this domestic 
water mismanagement as they “bear the disproportionate share of the impact of inefficient water and 
sanitation services” (Barghouti, 2010, 5). They are less often connected to piped water supplies, often 
share water installation services, and pay more (relatively speaking) for water access than those in the 
socio-economic classes above them (Ibid). Similarly the poor are the sector of the population most likely 
to bear the weight of the negative externalities associated with rising virtual water import as the price 
fluctuations of the global food market affect them most severely. Additionally, as food security threats 
rise with the increase in virtual water import, the poor are the sector of the population most likely to be hit 
the hardest in the event a crisis arises. 
 Contemporary literature focuses on two variables in particular as being especially responsible for 
rising virtual water consumption: population and income. Virtual water consumption—a term closely 
correlated with virtual water import in water scarce regions of the world—is very obviously affected by 
The Effect of Population and Income 
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population growth (how many people must eat) and personal income (how much money people have to 
eat). 
 The extent of correlation between population growth and domestic water withdrawal is useful 
when making predictions as to population’s effect on virtual water import. In the MENA region, from 
1985 to 2000, water withdrawal from domestic sources rose 50 percent as population growth rose 40 
percent (Barghouti, 4, 2010). This 5-4 ratio puts into context how draining population growth is on 
MENA countries’ water resources and gives basis for the concern that as domestic water dwindles, the 
only alternative is for virtual water import to rise. 
Although a nation’s population growth inevitably leads to greater overall virtual water 
consumption, it should be remembered that this consumption is met by both internal and external water 
sources. This is to say, population is a variable truly independent from virtual water consumption, or in 
the specific case of this research, virtual water import. If a nation’s internal water use becomes more 
productive (i.e. a more favorable drop per crop ratio is achieved) and the nation chooses to cover its 
increased virtual water consumption with these greater crop yields, virtual water import will not increase, 
despite population growth. If internal water efficiency and crop production capacity increase at a rate 
exceeding population growth, it can be the case that virtual water import actually declines even as more 
people consume virtual water. 
Likewise with rising incomes, the effect on virtual water consumption is more dynamic than one 
might initially assume. While it is true that increased income corresponds to increased food consumption 
capacity, a higher income likewise augments individuals’ ability to conscientiously consume low water 
content foods, if and when policies encourage them to do so. Additionally, the issue of what types of 
foods people want to consume as they become more wealthy is a crucial issue at play in regards to virtual 
water. While UNEP notes that changing food consumption habits among the world’s rising middle-class 
have increased the amount of people eating high water content meat products (Carus, 2010), it is not 
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always the case that the more expensive food commodities have higher water contents. In countries such 
as the United States, fruits and vegetables which comprise the low water content vegan diet are sold at 
high prices often beyond the purchasing range of the poor (Kenner, 2008). Thus it becomes clear that a 
person’s rising income does not in and of itself determine whether or not a person will consume more or 
less water via the foods he or she eats. A rising income provides individuals the ability to either reduce or 
increase their virtual water consumption based on their ultimate decisions as consumers. 
While reputable international development organizations like the World Bank and FAO, as well 
as individual governments, provide comprehensive facts like available water supply and consumption by 
sector—they do so only in regards to domestic water resources. Virtual water research remains a highly 
‘ivory tower’ pursuit, with little practice among the organizations most likely to produce policy relevant 
data. This will need to change for virtual water to become practically relevant on an international scale. In 
water scarce regions like the MENA, food security and water conservation are directly connected in the 
policy sphere. Successful policy measures for both begin with proper, comprehensive data collection 
practices. In the paper: “Let it Reign: The New Water Paradigm for Global Food Security” it is noted that 
“assessments of national virtual water balances (import/export) are a key component of future food and 
nutritional security” (Stockholm International Water Institute, 2005, 4). As global water scarcity increases 
and water consumption accounting takes on increasing significance, there clearly is rationale for including 
virtual water import/export figures into the overall quantitative picture of water consumption at large. 
This is particularly the case in countries like Egypt where food imports of crops like wheat constitute an 
enormous portion of overall water consumption. In such instances, measuring water associated with only 
the domestically grown commodities paints only half the picture.  
Virtual Water in the Policy Sphere 
Public Dietary Preferences 
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An analysis of virtual water’s significance in the policy sphere reveals two primary access points: 
public dietary preferences and agricultural practices—particularly irrigation.Reducing a society’s 
consumption of high water content foods without sacrificing nutrition via policy is a complicated matter. 
Radical but necessary reforms often seem impossible initially, particularly when they intrude on personal 
autonomy. Changing society’s diet in a way that reduces water consumption walks the line in this regard. 
It’s hard to imagine governments in the MENA region mandating that citizens limit their per capita 
consumption of high water content food like meat. Very easily one can imagine the difficulties which 
would likely arise from such an action in terms of public discontent and the logistics of enforcement. 
Nonetheless, as the global significance of the relationship between diet and virtual water consumption 
rises, enforcement of diet related policies may become easier. This will be increasingly true if 
organizations like the United Nations continue to stress on a global scale the notion that a dietary shift 
away from meat and dairy products is crucial to the prevention of future starvation (Carus, 2010). Some 
of the effective diet oriented practices governments can embark on to minimize citizens’ virtual water 
consumption include the following: 
• Foods can be analyzed in terms of their overall nutritional value relative to their water 
content, and based on these calculations governments can promote consumption of 
certain foods over others (Stockholm International Water Institute, 2005, 4). 
• Nutrition information on packaged food products can include water content data, 
including water/nutrient ratios (Ibid, 5). 
• Institute market based incentives, such as subsidies, for the production and consumption 
of low water content/high nutritional food products (Ibid, 5). 
 
Agricultural Practices 
It is imperative that MENA countries pursue more water efficient agricultural practices, despite 
the technological and financial challenges. More efficient domestic water use allows a country to increase 
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the proportion of its agricultural yield relative to the water used. In short, the same amount of water can 
yield more crops, in turn reducing food import demand and virtual water import dependency. 
The water efficiency of existing agricultural practices in the Middle East is a matter of debate. 
Egypt, the world’s largest importer of wheat, exemplifies how a country can simultaneously excel and fail 
in terms of efficiently using its water resources. Facing extreme limitations in regards to water supply and 
technological capacity, Egyptian farmers are relatively thrifty: “the Egyptian farmer is a bastion of water-
management virtue, producing two crops and simultaneously achieving levels of livestock management 
similar to the average northern European farmer” (Allan, 2011, 253). It can thus be said MENA farmers 
in countries such as Egypt exhibit relative efficiency provided the austere conditions under which they 
operate. Nonetheless, this is not to say that room for agricultural water use improvement does not exist, 
quite the contrary.  
At Egypt’s High Dam more water is lost to evaporation without agricultural yield than any other 
location in the world. Roughly 13 cubic kilometers of evaporated water evaporate from the dam’s 
reservoir each year, constituting 15 percent of the Nile’s average annual flow and enough water to meet 
the water consumption needs of ten million people (Ibid, 250). This lost water is certainly one area among 
several contributing to the total unfulfilled potential of water use in Egypt. The extent to which more 
efficient water management practices can lead to higher agricultural productivity—increased ‘crop per 
drop’ yields—may be as high as 50% in volume (Allan, 2010, 5).  Unfulfilled water potential does not 
plague Egypt alone. Throughout the MENA region deficiencies exist in agricultural water management 
manifesting themselves in a variety of ways such as ineffective spending on water efficient technology, 
poor institutional frameworks for water management, weak water governance practices, and a lack of 
trained water management professionals in the sector at large (Abou-Hadid, 2010, 56). 
Improving water use efficiency in the MENA region is a double-edged sword. Water saving 
technological improvements in developing MENA countries are often cost prohibitive unless supported 
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by investment (Black and King, 2009, 13); what more, as water becomes more scarce and difficult to 
access, the cost of these technologically based efficiency upgrades rises. While financial obstacles remain 
a formidable barrier to more efficient water management practices in the MENA region, the long-term 
benefit of investment in better practices is invaluable given the severity of the current water scarcity 
situation. Improving water efficiency in the agricultural sector can be achieved through focus on three 
broad categories: capacity building, institutional reform, and policy initiatives/fiscal measures. 
Capacity Building: 
• Investment in small-scale irrigation technology for farmers not connected to larger irrigation 
grids/projects (Black and King, 2009, 13). 
• Support the capacity of farmers to engage in rainwater harvesting via the provision of capital and 
knowledge (Ibid). 
• Strengthen the agricultural sector’s water infrastructure—particularly in regards to retrieval, 
transport and reuse of wastewater—in a manner that maximizes water use dividends (Stockholm 
International Water Institute, 2005, 4). Water transport can be developed in such a way that 
irrigation supply better matches the water demand of crops and agricultural drainage water is 
reused more efficiently. 
 
Institutional Reform 
• Strengthen the management, coordination, transparency, accountability, and over-all 
technological know-how of the water governance authorities in the MENA region (Abou-Hadid, 
2010, 58). 
 
Policy Initiatives/Fiscal Measures 
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• Investigate how current agricultural subsidies relate to water use efficiency (Stockholm 
International Water Institute, 2005, 5). Based on this knowledge governments should pursue 
“rebates, reduced taxes, targeted subsidies, price signals, and other economic incentives” (Abou-
Hadid, 2010, 57) that seek to shape the supply side of the agricultural market in such a way that 
minimizes water usage. Along these lines, governments should reevaluate current policies that 
seek to meet growing food demand by subsidizing the use of water in the agricultural sector, an 
action that has the backlash effect of distorting the supply/demand market as irrigation water is 
distributed “at well below the cost of service provision” (Ibid, 56). 
• Promote water sharing networks and coordination within the private agricultural sector to 
maximize the dividends of national water use (Stockholm International Water Institute, 2005, 5). 
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III. Data Description 
 The researcher uses panel data for 18 countries covering a total of 5 years: (2000 and 2008-2011), 
collected from a variety of sources. In the case of the independent variables, data comes from the World 
Bank and Food and Agriculture Organization’s AQUASTAT database. Data for the dependent variable 
virtual water import is gathered using trade data from the International Trade Center and water content 
figures from the FAO. 
 Based on World Bank (2011) classifications, the researcher includes the following 18 countries as 
constituting the MENA Region: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen. Although 
officially part of the MENA region, Palestine isexcluded from the panel data due to limitations in tracking 
its trade figures such as to make meaningful virtual water estimates. 
Defining the MENA Region 
Virtual Water Import (Dependent variable) 
Variable Descriptions 
 The dependent variable: virtual water import is operationalized by calculating its value for the 
respective MENA countries over 5 years: 2008-2011, as well as 2000. This process is done via 
multiplying trade data from the International Trade Centre with water content figures from the FAO. The 
data collected for 2008-2011 is original primary data produced via this method while the data gathered 
from 2000 is retrieved data from leading virtual water experts Hoekstra and Mekonnen (2011)—
themselves using the same methodology. The researcher picks data from 2000, as well as 2008-2011 
based on data availability. The researcher acknowledges an 8 eight year gap (2000 to 2008) is not 
standard, however in the case of this research and the limited time-frame given, remains the best option 
for increasing the number of observations.  
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For the collection of the trade data, the researcher uses a data program called: Trade Map.This 
International Trade Center data program provides import/export figures regarding the trade of agricultural 
commodities—both crop and animal. Trade map allows for product classification on a six-digit level. 
Every two digits in the six digit number are a code for a certain animal or crop classification. Take the 
following example for a number such as 010511. 
• 01-Indicates the product is a live animal 
• 0105-Indicates the product is a live animal and the animal category is fowl 
• 010511-Indicates the product is a live animal, in the fowl category, weighing more than 185 
grams.      (ITC Trade Map, 2012) 
 
The proposed thesis divides agricultural imports into two categories: crop and animal. Based on 
the availability of trade data, the research tracks the import of the following 17 crops which constitute 
roughly 68 percent of total crop water use: wheat, rice, maize, soy beans, sugar cane, seed cotton, barley, 
sorghum, palm oil, coconuts, millet, coffee, cassava, groundnuts, potatoes, rapeseed, and natural rubber 
(Hoekstra and Mekonnen No. 47, 2010, 13) Modeling previous virtual water research, the animal 
products evaluated are broken into eight broad categories: beef cattle, dairy cows, swine, sheep, goats, 
fowls/poultry, laying hens, and horses (Chapagain and Hoekstra, 2007). Thechart below lists the crop and 
animal commodities chosen. For the 17 crop products, water footprint percentages are given to provide a 
sense for their virtual water significance. 
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Crop Products (17) Percentage of Total 
Water Footprint of 
Crop Water 
Production 
Animal Products (5) 
Wheat 15 Bovine 
Swine 
Sheep 
Goats 
Fowls/poultry 
 
 
Rice 13 
Maize 10 
Soya beans 5 
Sugar cane 4 
Seed cotton 3 
Barley 3 
Sorghum 2 
Oil palm 2 
Coconuts 2 
Millet 2 
Coffee 2 
Groundnuts 1 
Natural Rubber 1 
Tobacco 1 
Rapeseed 1 
Seed Cotton 1 
  
 After the trade data for these agricultural products is gathered (measured in terms of quantity) it is 
multiplied by water content estimates. The water content estimates for these respective 17 crop and 5 
animal products come from two sources: The Green, Blue, and Grey Water Footprint of Crops and 
Derived Crop Products as well as The Green, Blue, and Grey Water Footprint of Farm Animals and 
Animal Products (Hoekstra and Mekkonen, 2010). Take the following as an example of this process. In 
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2010 Bahrain imported 67,337 tons of rice. Given that the global estimate for the amount of water 
required to produce one ton of rice is 1146 cubic meters, the following yields the amount of virtual water 
imported by Bahrain through its import of rice: 
 
67, 337 tons of rice at 1146 cubic meters/ton = 77,168,202 cubic meters of virtual water 
The virtual water estimates conducted in this research (2008-2011) are original figures. They are 
produced by replicating the standard paradigm for calculating the virtual water of agricultural products: 
multiple the product’s water content (cubic meters per ton) by the quantity of the good traded (tons).  
The 17 agricultural products selected are chosen based on their high water content levels. They 
represent 68 percent of the total water footprint of crop production (Hoekstra and Mekonnen, 2010, 13). 
Thus, after calculating virtual water import for these 17 crop products, the figures were divided by .68 to 
give estimates for total virtual water import. Put simply, the 17 crops chosen only constitute 68 percent of 
the possible virtual water import a country could feasibly have. The remaining 32 percent of crops 
capable of affecting a country’s overall virtual water import could have been tracked, but are not in this 
thesis due to their large number and small individual contributions to virtual water at large. In other 
words, while 17 crops constitute 68 percent of the total water footprint of crop production, far more 
constitute the remaining 32 percent.The circle graph on the following page is that used for the research. 
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1
One of the chief difficulties in virtual water import accounting is determining the crops which 
constitute the bulk of a nation’s virtual water import. It is beyond the scope of this research (and research 
far more advanced than this) to produce a perfect virtual water estimate as doing so requires accurate data 
and analysis of all agricultural imports.This said, looking at what crop and animal commodities a nation 
imports in large quantity is an obvious first step, bearing in mind the important point that if a 
commodityimported in large quantity does not itself havea highvirtual water content, it may not actually 
 
 
(Hoeksta and Mekonnen, 2011) 
 
                                                          
1 Fodder crops (9%) are not used in the researcher’s virtual water estimates for two reasons. First, trade data for 
fodder crops as a category does not exist. Secondly, and most importantly, the water content of fodder crops is 
included in the virtual water content of the animal commodities themselves.  
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be a major source of virtual water import. Conversely, a highvirtual water content commodity imported in 
smaller quantity may be crucial to virtual water import estimations, but overlooked as it does not register 
as a major import. This is the danger of assuming one can accurately estimate virtual water import simply 
by evaluating the 20 or 30 largest commodities imported. At the same, trying to calculate virtual water 
import by looking strictly at the import of high water content foods can be problematic if the foods are 
imported in such low quantity as to not substantially affect overall virtual water import. In summary, there 
are two import criteria to bear in mind: the commodity’s quantity of import and the commodity’s virtual 
water content. 
This research evaluates the import of the crops which constitute 68% of crop water production, 
recognizing the distinction that these crops do not constitute the same percentage of virtual water import. 
Given this research’s attempt to estimate virtual water import for 18 different countries that import crop 
and animal commodities in highly variant quantities, the researcher chose to use the ‘high water content 
methodology’ for determing the commodities to evaluate. The 17 crops and 5 animal products assessed 
are chosen based on their substantial water contents (outlined in the previous crop water production 
graph). Additionally, the researcher’s review of the literature confirms that the essential commodities 
evaluated herein correspond with the essential commodities used in published research (wheat, rice, 
barley, coffee, beans, chicken, beef, goat meat, etc.) 
 Below is a summary chart depicting the structure of the excel data used to produce final panel 
data estimates (real figures used): 
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Year Country Crop Water Content 
(cubic 
meters/ton) 
Quantity 
Imported 
(tons) 
Virtual Water 
Import (cubic 
meters) 
2008 Egypt Wheat 1277 4,077,543 5,207,022,411 
2009 Egypt Wheat 1277 4,059,927 5,184,526,779 
2010 Egypt Wheat 1277 9,926,578 12,676,240,106 
2011 Egypt Wheat 1277 10,516,045 13,428,989,465 
2008 Egypt Rice 1146 11,605 13,299,330 
2009 Egypt Rice 1146 16,257 18,630,522 
2010 Egypt Rice 1146 17,649 20,225,754 
2011 Egypt Rice 1146 53,238 61,010,748 
 
Population (Independent variable): 
 The variable population is regressed in three different forms against virtual water import: total 
population in millions, percentage growth, and first difference for each year and that before. Population 
figures for the 18 respective MENA countries are calculated via the World Bank database (2013) for 2000 
and 2008-2011. Population growth figures are likewise gathered from the World Bank database, while 
first-difference figures are created by the researcher using Excel. 
GDP (Independent variable): 
 GDP per capita data for the respective MENA countries listed is calculated with data from the 
World Bank (2013) for the periods 2000 and 2008-2011. It is listed in current US dollars. 
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Total Water Withdrawal and Renewable Water Resources Per Capita (Independent variable): 
 
 Total domestic water withdrawal is provided by the FAO’s AQUASTAT database. The 
researcher uses the data filling technique: constant incremental change for missing years. Regarding 
renewable water resources per capita, the data is gathered over four year intervals. The researcher thus 
takes the provided figures for 2007 and 2011 and estimates the years 2008, 2009, and 2010 by assuming 
constant incremental change. In the case of the year 2000, the researcher uses the closest year provided by 
the FAO database, the difference never exceeding more than two years. 
Total Foreign Reserves (Independent variable): 
 Foreign reserve data is gathered via the World Bank database (2013). It is calculated in US 
dollars and includes gold. 
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Final Panel Dataset 
 The composition of the final panel dataset produces a total of 90 observations—18 countries over 
5 years.  The chart below models this for 2 of the 18 countries. 
 Year Virtual 
Water 
Import 
(billions of 
cubic 
meters) 
 
Population 
(millions) 
GDP 
(billions of 
USD) 
FX 
Reserves 
(billions of 
USD) 
Total 
Water 
Withdrawal 
(billions of 
cubic 
meters) 
Algeria 2000 14.51 
 
30.53 54.79 13.56 1.112 
Algeria 2008 42.43 34.43 170.99 148.10 2.001 
Algeria 2009 38.72 34.95 138.12 155.11 2.112 
Algeria 2010 40.03 35.47 161.98 170.46 2.224 
Algeria 2011 51.45 35.98 188.68 191.37 2.335 
Bahrain 2000 1.02 0.64 7.97 1.61 0.091 
Bahrain 2008 0.92 1.05 21.90 4.05 0.164 
Bahrain 2009 0.72 1.17 19.32 4.01 0.173 
Bahrain 2010 1.04 1.26 22.95 5.30 0.182 
Bahrain 2011 0.77 1.32 26.7 4.77 0.191 
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IV. Research and Data Limitations 
Restriction of Crop Products in the Formulation of Virtual Water Import Calculations: 
 One of the biggest challenges in water footprint accounting is accurately tracking the water 
content of a specific crop or animal product as it undergoes processing into sub-products. Many of the 
major agricultural commodities like wheat and rice are broken down into sub-products such as wheat 
starch or rice flour. These different sub-crop products almost always vary from the primary crop in their 
water content—some requiring more water, others less. Often when a crop is processed into a crop 
product there is a loss of weight resulting in lower water content per ton for the new crop product 
(Chapagain and Hoekstra, 2007, 145), assuming no water is used in processing or additives. If however 
water is used in the processing of the new crop product, or the new crop product includes high water 
content additive substances, the derived product may have a water content higher than the primary crop. 
In terms of virtual water accounting of crop products, the specific water content data on derived 
crop products is only useful when trade data also exists for the sub-crop categories. In the event that trade 
data for all MENA countries exists for a sub-crop category such as corn flour, using the specific water 
content data for the sub-crop is only worthwhile if the good constitutes a meaningful portion of the 
overall trade of the primary crop. As an example, MENA countries imported an aggregate 7587 tons of 
wheat gluten in 2011. Wheat gluten has a water content figure twice as high as traditional wheat (2928 vs. 
1277 cubic meters ton). Nonetheless, 7,587 tons of wheat gluten is still only on the margins of virtual 
water significance compared to theprimary crop wheat. Wheat imports totaled 35,066,859 tons for all 
MENA countries in 2011 (ITC, 2012). Wheat gluten imports constitute a quantity that is 0.00022 of 
overall wheat imports, roughly one fifth of one percent. Therefore, even with its higher water content, one 
can see how tracking the import of wheat gluten as a specific product category is marginal in terms of 
estimating the entire virtual water import of a nation. 
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Consequently, the researcher is acknowledging the limitation of not be able to specifically 
incorporate all derived crop-products in his research. Of the 17 crop products examined in the research, 
13 have notable sub-crop products with different virtual water contents. Of these 13, the specific sub-crop 
water content data is incorporated in the virtual water calculation for the overall crop product assuming 
the following conditions are met: 
• Trade data exists for the sub-crop product for at least 14 of the 18 MENA countries 
examined. 
• The sub-crop product constitutes a significant portion of the overall trade of the primary 
crop—10 percent or more. 
These conditions in place, the following sub-products are used in the researcher’s virtual water 
calculations: wheat flour, potato flakes, refined sugar, soybean oil, and refined coconut oil. 
In regards to the virtual water associated with animal products, 5 meat categories are included: 
bovine, swine, poultry, sheep, and goat. These five animal categories correspond to those evaluated by 
leading virtual water researchers (Chapagain and Hoekstra, 2007, 145), however it is worth noting that 
these researchers also track the virtual water content of the animal categories: laying hens and horses—
data not used in this research due to unavailability. The virtual water calculations for these animal 
categories examine the meat of these animals in all of its different states: fresh, chilled, and frozen. 
Poultry however, is an exception as the trade database only allows the researcher to track imports of live 
poultry. 
A nation’s virtual water consumption—real and virtual, domestic and foreign, generally occurs 
under the three following sectors: agriculture, industry, and municipal. The proposed research will only 
account for virtual water consumed via the agricultural sector for the following two reasons: 
Restricting Virtual Water Import Specifically to Agriculture 
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1) As a general rule, agricultural commodities account for the largest portion of a nation’s 
overall water consumption (Chapagain and Hoekstra, 144, 2007). 
2) The purpose of the proposed research is to measure virtual water consumption. 
Consequently, applying virtual water theory, agriculture is the sector most fit for this 
type of analysis. Via water content data of food commodities and trade flow statistics, 
it is possible to estimate the complete water consumption of a nation in the agricultural 
sector. It is important to remember that via virtual water logic, water consumption of 
nation (x) can represent itself in the agricultural sector of country (y). For industrial 
water use, it is more difficult to make virtual water calculations as water content data 
on products is not available to the same extent. 
 
 In the virtual water/water footprint accounting field of study, water is categorized into the 
following three types: blue, green and grey. Blue refers to surface water in streams, lakes, etc.; green 
refers to rainwater; and grey refers to water used to reduce agricultural pollutants to acceptable levels 
(Chapagain and Hoekstra, 2007, 144). If researchers are aware of how countries use water for agriculture, 
estimates can be made in regards to the amount of blue, green, grey water use. For the sake of simplicity, 
this will not be attempted in the proposed research. It is assumed that virtual water refers to green water. 
While this may seem counter-intuitive as the MENA region as a whole receives very little annual rainfall; 
nonetheless, the renewable water resources the region does have access to (rivers, streams, groundwater, 
etc.) are replenished by rainfall often beyond the MENA’s borders (i.e., the Nile basin). 
Restricting Virtual Water to Green Water 
 Missing trade data used for the calculation of virtual water import is filled in by the researcher. 
The researcher usesaverage interval change to fill in missing years based on years for which information 
Missing Data  
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is given. In situations where no trade data exists for any of the years, the researcher proceeds in his virtual 
water estimations, ignoring the missing data. With the exception of Saudi Arabia, discussed below, there 
are only three instances in which this occurs: data regarding oil palm import for Syria and Iran, poultry 
import for Iran, Yemen, and Libya, and lastly data regarding seed cotton import in Libya. Concerning 
missing data points for the independent variables, similarly the researcher uses the average interval 
change method among the existing years to fill in missing points. 
Saudi Arabia 
 Trade data for the country Saudi Arabia is far more limited than is the case for any of the other 17 
countries—particularly for the year 2011. This in mind, the researcher removes Saudi Arabia: 2011 data 
from the regression. Thus for the majority of the regression models, the number of observations is 89 
rather than 90. For the remaining three years in which the researcher estimates virtual water import, Saudi 
Arabia crop data is likewise less available than the other countries. The researcher speculates that Saudi 
Arabia virtual water estimates for the years 2008, 2009, 2010 are lower than they should be.  
Population Figures for GCC Countries 
 It is noted that for the following countries World Bank population figures may not be completely 
accurate: Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Oman. As migrant worker 
contingencies in these countries are large and non-nationals compose a substantial portion of gross 
residency in these countries—the researcher speculates the population data used may be lower than is 
factual. Nonetheless, it is clear the World Bank population figures take into account—at least to an 
extent—the non-national populations of these countries. The World Bank’s population figure for Qatar 
(2011) is: 1.87 million. While official figures for the number of Qatari nationals are difficult to find, 
estimates generally have the Qatari national population between 200,000 and 300,000. Based on a 1970 
census and a possible growth rate of 4.5% annual, the Qatari national population is predicted at 255,280 
(Lockerbie, 2013). Given the World Bank’s 1.87 million figure, it is clear it takes into account the 
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country’s non-national residents in its population data at least to a degree, bearing in mind limited 
information and  the political sensitivity of the matter. 
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V. Methodology 
Model 1: Absolutes 
Explanations of Models Used 
All variables are regressed in their absolute forms. 
• Y(it) = f (Population(it), GDP(it), Aggregate Foreign Reserves(it), Total Domestic Water 
Withdrawal(it),ԑ(it)) 
where Y = virtual water import, i = country, and t = time 
Model 2: First differences 
All variables are regressed in terms of their absolute change (first differences). 
• Y(it) = f (First Difference Population(it), First Difference GDP(it), First Difference Aggregate 
Foreign Reserves(it), First Difference Total Domestic Water Withdrawal(it), ԑ(it) ) 
where Y = virtual water import, i = country, and t = time 
Model 3: Per capita measurements 
All variables are regressed in their per capita forms. Population is thus removed from the equation as the 
per capita forms of the remaining variables take it into account. Units on the variables change: GDP per 
capita is measured in thousands of USD, foreign reserves in thousands of USD, and water withdrawal in 
thousands of cubic meters. 
• Y (it) = f (GDP Per Capita(it), Foreign Reserves Per Capita(it), Domestic Water Withdrawal Per 
Capita(it), ԑ(it) ) 
where Y = virtual water import, i = country, and t = time 
Model 4: Percentage change 
All variables are regressed in terms of their percentage change. 
• Y (it) = f (% Change Population(it), % Change GDP(it), % Change Aggregate Foreign 
Reserves(it), % Change Total Domestic Water Withdrawal(it), ԑ(it) ) 
where Y = virtual water import, i = country, and t = time 
Model 5: Fixed time effect 
Replicating Model 1, the researcher then adds the fixed variable time effect (V). 
• Y (it) = f (Population(it), GDP(it), Aggregate Foreign Reserves(it), Total Domestic Water 
Withdrawal(it), V(t),  ԑ(it) ) 
where Y = virtual water import, i = country, and t = time 
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Model 6: Fixed country effect 
Replicating Model 1, the researcher then adds the fixed variable country effect (µ). 
• Y (it) = f (Population(it), GDP(it), Aggregate Foreign Reserves(it), Total Domestic Water 
Withdrawal(it), µ(i),  ԑ(it) ) 
where Y = virtual water import, i = country, and t = time 
 
Model 7: Fixed time/country effect 
Replicating Model 1, the researcher then adds both the fixed variable time (V) and country (µ) effects. 
• Y (it) = f (Population(it), GDP(it), Aggregate Foreign Reserves(it), Total Domestic Water 
Withdrawal(it), V(t), µ(i),  ԑ(it) ) 
where Y = virtual water import, i = country, and t = time 
Model 8: Logs 
All variables are regressed as logs in attempt to limit heteroskedasticity within the variance. 
• Log Y (it) = f (log Population(it), log GDP(it), log Aggregate Foreign Reserves(it), log Total 
Domestic Water Withdrawal(it), ԑ(it) ) 
where Y = virtual water import, i = country, and t = time 
 
Model 9: Log-linear 
Log-linear regressions allow a researcher to see how variables measured in units can affect the percentage 
change of a dependent variable, often telling more than a linear-linear regression alone when making 
estimates for the future (Woolridge, 2009, 43). This in mind the researcher holds the independent 
variables in their normal units while changing virtual water import to a log form. 
• Log Y (it) = f (Population(it), GDP(it), Aggregate Foreign Reserves(it), Total Domestic Water 
Withdrawal(it), ԑ(it) ) 
where Y = virtual water import, i = country, and t = time 
 
Model 10: Per capita (water withdrawal per capita replaced with renewable water resources per capita) 
The researcher replicates the per capita structure of Model 3, however replaces water withdrawal per 
capita with renewable water resources per capita in effort to better capture how already existing water 
strain induces virtual water import. Population is removed from the equation to avoid multicollinearity as 
its change is already taken into consideration via renewable water resources per capita. Units on the 
variables stand as follows: GDP per capita is measured in thousands of USD, foreign reserves per capita 
in thousands of USD, and renewable water resources per capita in cubic meters. 
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• Y (it) = f (GDP Per Capita(it), Foreign Reserves Per Capita(it), Renewable Water Resources Per 
Capita(it), ԑ(it) ) 
where Y = virtual water import, i = country, and t = time 
Model 11: Absolute model with removal of year 2000. 
It is noted by the researcher’s committee that the substantial 8 year period between 2000 and 2008 may 
potentially skew the predicted variable effects. This in mind, the researcher provides a model only 
drawing on data from years 2008-2011. 
• Y(it) = f (Population(it), GDP(it), Aggregate Foreign Reserves(it), Total Domestic Water 
Withdrawal(it), 
where Y = virtual water import, i = country, and t = time 
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Population: 
Anticipated Variable Effects 
As population rises, virtual water consumption is certain to increase as more people are 
demanding food.  Thus the researcher expects a positive relationship while using growth rates and first 
differences to assess the specific effect of population growth on virtual water import. 
GDP Per Capita: 
GDP per capita data is chosen via the hypothesis that it has a positive relationship with virtual 
water import. This hypothesis is formed based on the following two assumptions: 1) a rising GDP per 
capita indicates higher individual purchasing power to consume increased levels of virtual water and 2) a 
rising GDP per capita indicates increased ability to adopt conspicuous consumption habits, which in the 
realm of food tends to mean more virtual water via products like meat. 
Total Domestic Water Withdrawal: 
 Given the difficulty in charting renewable water resources per capita without avoiding 
multicollinearity with population growth, total domestic water withdrawal is another way of speculating 
how domestic water conditions affect virtual water import incentive. The researcher is not certain what 
the relationship is, but speculates that greater water withdrawal from internal/domestic renewable should 
decrease virtual water import demand—a negative causal relationship. 
Renewable Water Resources Per Capita: 
This research hypothesizes that countries do not inherently want to import food to the extent of 
severe dependency—as is the case in numerous MENA countries; it is a consequence of their internal 
water scarcity situations. Renewable water resources per capita thus quantifies—to some extent—nations’ 
degree of desperation for virtual water, or inversely, their reluctance to use domestic water to meet food 
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consumption demand. This research hypothesizes a negative relationship. As a country’s renewable water 
resources per capita increase, incentive to import virtual water declines. 
Total Foreign Reserves: 
Foreign reserves dictate a nation’s ability to purchase food imports on the international market 
(James, 2013). Consequently, the hypothesized relationship between foreign reserves and virtual water 
import is positive: higher levels of foreign reserves lead to increased ability to import food/virtual water. 
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*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
  
                                                          
2 Model 10 use per capita variables identical to Model 3. Water withdrawal per capita is however replaced by 
renewable water resources per capita.  
 
 
Model 1 
Absolutes 
Model 2: 
1st Diff. 
Model 3 
Per 
Capita 
Model 4 
% Change 
Model 5 
Country 
effect 
Model 6 
Time 
effect 
Model 7 
Country-
time eff. 
Model 8 
Log 
Model 9 
Log-linear 
Model 10 
Per 
Capita 22
Model 11 
Absolutes 
w/o 2000  
Populatio
n  
(millions) 
 
 
0.568 
(0.000)*** 
3.305 
(0.500) 
 
--------- -3.875 
(0.730) 
1.508 
(0.000)*** 
0.555 
(0.000)*** 
1.557 
(0.000)*** 
1.022 
(0.000)*** 
0.021 
(0.000)*** 
--------- 0.588 
(0.000)*** 
Total FX 
Reserves 
(billions of 
USD) 
 
0.003 
(0.783) 
0.040 
(0.840) 
0.277 
(0.385) 
-0.962 
(0.500) 
-0.027 
(0.050)* 
0.003 
(0.793) 
-0.027 
(0.059)* 
0.113 
(0.002)*** 
0.000 
(0.407) 
0.031 
(0.901) 
0.003 
(0.785) 
GDP 
(billions of 
USD) 
 
0.045 
(0.000)*** 
0.032 
(0.584) 
0.112 
(0.115) 
1.696 
(0.354) 
0.057 
(0.000)*** 
0.040 
(0.001)*** 
0.061 
(0.002)*** 
-1.634 
(0.878) 
0.001 
(0.003)*** 
0.123 
(0.073)* 
0.036 
(0.007)*** 
Total 
Domestic 
Water 
Withdraw
al(billions 
of cubic 
meters) 
 
-0.196 
(0.005)*** 
2.308 
(0.549) 
0.149 
(0.952) 
-19.780 
(0.750) 
0.027 
(0.770) 
-0.179 
(0.013)** 
0.025 
(0.794) 
6.924 
(0.625) 
-0.009 
(0.005)*** 
--------- -0.169 
(0.052)* 
Renewabl
e Water 
Resources 
Per 
Capita 
(cubic 
meters) 
--------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- -0.002 
(0.331) 
--------- 
Time 
Effect 
 
 
--------- --------- --------- --------- No Yes Yes --------- --------- --------- --------- 
Country 
Effect 
 
--------- --------- --------- --------- Yes No Yes --------- --------- --------- --------- 
 
F 
 
0.000 0.437 0.084 0.790 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.058 0.000 
 
R2  
 
0.673 0.076 0.078 0.034 0.843 0.682 0.845 0.876 0.540 0.084 0.679 
 
N 
 
89 51 85 53 89 89 89 50 89 89 71 
Regression: Linear-Linear 
 Dependent Variable: Virtual Water Import 
(billions of cubic meters) 
 
Table 1: Regression Model Results 
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VI. Analysis of the Data 
 The analysis herein is composed of three parts: 1) discussion on the significance of the regression 
models as well asregression based forecasting 2) correlation graphing that attempts to highlight additional 
aspects of the variables’ relationship 3) general observations from the panel dataset. 
 A broad analysis of the Table 1 results shows the following frequencies of significance for the 
respective variable coefficients: Population (7 of 9 models), GDP (7 of 11 models), FX reserves (3 of 11 
models), Water withdrawal (4 of 10 models), Renewable water resources per capita (0 of 1 models). See 
below for model specific analysis. 
The Regression Models: Significance and Forecasting: 
Model 1: Absolutes 
Assessing the Accuracy:  
 Three variables have significance at the 0.01 level and are included to create the model: 
population, GDP, and total domestic water withdrawal. The coefficient on foreign reserves does not prove 
significant and is dropped; the model thus estimates the following: 
Virtual Water Import = βo + β1 (Population) + β2 (GDP)+ β3 (Total Domestic Water Withdrawal) 
Virtual Water Import = 1.314 + 0.568 (Population) + 0.045 (GDP) + ----0.196 (Total Domestic Water 
Withdrawal) 
 The positive coefficients on population and GDP indicate the relationship expected. As 
population (millions) and GDP (billions) rise, so to do does virtual water import. Specifically the 
researcher speculates the following: population increase is indicative of higher virtual water demand, 
while GDP increases virtual water import as, on a per capita basis, individuals consume more and the 
nation at large has increased purchasing power. The negative coefficient on Total Domestic Water 
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Withdrawal (----0.196) is interesting and certainly not obvious. This research speculates that high domestic 
water withdrawal offsets the need to import virtual water. Countries cover more of their gross virtual 
water demand via greater withdrawal from domestic resources, limiting virtual water import dependency. 
Whether or not this is desirable depends entirely on the internal water scarcity of the country at hand. 
 Below is an analysis of the regression’s accuracy in predicting virtual water import for the 
MENA region as a whole forthe year 2011.  The following MENA averages from the panel data (2011) 
are used in the predicted equation: population: 22.14million, GDP: 142.75 billion USD, and total 
domestic water withdrawal: 16.82 billion cubic meters. 
Predicted virtual water import using MENA region averages(2011) = 1.314+ 0.568 (Population) + 0.045 
(GDP) + ----0.196 (Total Domestic Water Withdrawal) 
Predicted virtual water import using MENA region averages (2011) = 1.314+ 0.568 (22.14) + 0.045 
(142.75) +----0.196 (16.82) 
Predicted virtual water import using MENA region averages (2011) = 17.01billion cubic meters  
Actual average from panel dataset for MENA countries (2011) = 17.10 billion cubic meters  
Forecasting 
Bearing in mind some reasonable expectations for how each of these three variables might change 
in upcoming years, one can make predictions for a year such as 2025. It is however difficult to make 
predictions about future domestic water withdrawal given the finite nature of domestic water resources. 
Despite the variable’s statistical significance in the regression analysis, it is removed from the equation 
used for forecasting. While the years 2008-2011 showa total domestic water withdrawal increase of 
roughly 5% annually,given scarce water resources and declining rainfall, it is highly unlikely such a trend 
will continue—particularly over the course of 14 years between 2011 and 2025. While likewise it cannot 
be assumed population and GDP figures grow, the growth of these variables is not restricted in the same 
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way as water withdrawal as they are not linked to a finite natural resource. Thus the regression for 
predicting virtual water import—relying on population and GDP growth of 3% each—stands as: 
Virtual Water Import = 1.314+ 0.568 (Population) + 0.045 (GDP) 
Country Virtual Water Import: 2011 
(Billions of cubic meters) 
-- Panel Dataset-- 
Virtual Water Import: 2025 
(Billions of cubic meters) 
--Predicted via Regression Model 
assuming 3% growth figures for 
population and GDP-- 
Egypt 65.16 87.85 
Syria 14.05 23.81 
Qatar 1.14 14.70 
Iraq 14.47 37.48 
Yemen 13.04 24.92 
 
 This research acknowledges a variety of other factors at work other than population and GDP 
affecting virtual water. The estimates above are raw and speculative, this said, it is fairly clear that virtual 
water import in the MENA region is on the rise—some might say disproportionately so.In a water scarce 
nation such as Yemen, a predicted 2025 virtual water import of 24.92 billion cubic meters for a predicted 
population of 37.51million inhabitants is alarmingly high. To put the figure in perspective, the entire 
country of India with a population of over a billion people: 1,053,898,107 in the year 2000 had a similar 
level of total virtual water import at 23.39 billion cubic meters (Hoekstra and Mekonnen, 2011). Granted 
the internal water scarcity situation in India remains different, it puts in perspective how large virtual 
water import may grow to be among the most water scarce MENA countries. The Catch-22 of the 
situation at large is that growth in a country’s population and GDP are generally speaking desirable. How 
then do MENA countries pursue growth in these areas without pushing virtual water import to 
dangerously high levels? This question is explored in the researcher’s findings section. 
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Models 2-4: First Differences, Per Capita, and % Change 
 These three models fail to produce any significant coefficients. Furthermore, the incredibly low  
r-squared results indicate the inability of the models to produce predictive regression equations. 
Model 5-7: Country and Time Effect 
 These models simulate country and time effects via the use of 0/1 dummy variables. In all 
instances: time effect, country effect, and time-country effect, the researcher observes slight changes to 
the coefficients for each of the independent variables. For time effect Model 6, removal of the year 2000, 
results in a slighter higher r-squared. The researcher speculates that the year 2000 does not fit the 
estimated regression as well as the other years (2008-11), given the 8-year gap. 
Models 8 and9: Log and Log-Linear 
Model 9, the more significant of the two models, provides estimates for percentage change in 
virtual water import based on unit changes to the independent variables. The model’s regression equation, 
based on the variables deemed significant, can be written as follows: 
Log Virtual Water Import = βo + β1 (Population) + β2 (GDP) + β3 (Total Domestic Water Withdrawal) 
Log Virtual Water Import = 0.501 + 0.021 (Population) + 0.001 (GDP) + ----0.009 (Total Domestic Water 
Withdrawal  
 The model thus estimates that 1 unit increases to each of the independent variables produces a 
virtual water import increase of 1.3%. The long-term predictive capability of the model may be less 
informative. To begin there is the uncertainty of domestic water withdrawal in the long-term future, as is 
discussed in the Model 1 analysis. Thus, if the water withdrawal variable is removed, as its relationship is 
negative, predicted virtual water import rises.  
Log Virtual Water Import = 0.501 + 0.021 (Population) + 0.001 (GDP) 
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 1 unit increases to population and GDP thus predict a 2.2% increase to virtual water import. 
Assuming population and GDP growth rates of 3% annually for the region’s countries, this model’s 
prediction of future levels of virtual water import produces results different than that of Model 1. Take 
Yemen as an example. Assuming population and GDP growth of 3% annually between 2011 and 2025, 
the unit increases will be 12.71 and 17.31, respectively. The model thus predicts: 
Log Virtual Water Import = 0.021 (12.71) + 0.001 (17.31) 
Log Virtual Water Import = 0.2842 
Virtual Water Import Increase = 28.42% 
 A 28.42% increase to Yemen’s virtual water import figure for 2011 results in a 2025 prediction 
of: 16.75 billion cubic meters, substantially lower than the 24.92 estimate of Model 1. Similar log-linear 
estimations for Egypt and Qatar yield results which are likewise substantially lower than those made for 
the countries via Model 1.  
Accuracy of the Model 
 Using the full model over the panel data years specifically (water withdrawal variable included), 
the model’s accuracy can be tested. Yemen’s virtual water import, as is estimated in the panel data, 
increases from12.77 billion cubic meters in 2010 to 13.04 billion cubic meters in 2011—a percentage 
change of 2.11. The unit changes to each of its three significant variables during this period areas follows: 
Population: 0.75 million, GDP: 2.72 billion, and Total Domestic Water Withdrawal: 0.033 billion. Thus: 
Log Virtual Water Import = 0.021 (0.75) + 0.001 (2.72) + ----0.009 (0.033) 
Log Virtual Water Import = 0.0182  
Virtual Water Import Increase: 1.82% 
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 The predicted increase of 1.82% is lower than the actual of 2.11% but achieves relative accuracy 
in matching the panel data estimations for virtual water import. Accuracy of this log-linear model in 
producing results which match those seen in the panel data depends largely on the country chosen. Tests 
for Egypt, as an example, do not prove informative. Egypt’s high domestic water withdrawal figures, 
when multiplied by the negative coefficient (-0.009), too strongly work against the other variables in the 
equation. Indeed, the accuracy of this model for Yemen may largely be due to the country’s minimal 
domestic water withdrawal—increasing only 0.033 billion cubic meters from 2010 (3.73) to 2011 (3.763). 
Models 10 and 11: Second Per Capita Model (w/ Renewable Water Resources) and Second Absolute 
Model (w/ Year 2000 removed) 
 Of the independent variables for Model 10only GDP proves to be significant (0.10 level).It is 
however worth noting that the coefficient for renewable water resources per capita is negative (-0.002). 
While the significance level stands at an unimpressive 0.333, the negative relationship remains interesting 
to the researcher. The reason for this is that it indicates the possibility of the research’s water strain theory 
holding true. To recall, this research hypothesizes that domestic water strain is a potential incentive for 
virtual water import. As renewable water resources per capita decline, countries become more inclined to 
cover food demand via the use of external water resources. The inverse of this relationship is thus 
reflected in the regression equation’s negative coefficient: as renewable water resources per capita 
increase, virtual water import declines. This notion is further supported by the correlation graphing herein 
(see Graph 2). In the case of Model 11, which removes the year 2000 from the regression, the results are 
almost identical to those produced in the time-effect model (Model 6) as they essentially perform the 
same operation. As stated, the r-squared indicates a more effective model with the year 2000 excluded. 
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 The dots in all three linear graphs hereinrepresent observations for the 18 MENA countries. They 
are estimations using information provided in the panel data. The y-axis in all graphs charts virtual water 
import, while the x-axis depicts one of three different domestic water conditions: Graph 1-water 
withdrawal, Graph 2-water scarcity, Graph 3-agricultrually induced domestic water strain. 
Correlation Graphing 
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Graph 1—Virtual Water Import vs. Total Domestic Water Withdrawal 
 
 
Graph 13
                                                          
3Graph 1 consists of 90 data points (18 country observations over 5 years: 2000 and 2008-2011). The x-axis data: 
total domestic water withdrawal is provided by FAO’s AQUASTAT database. The researcher used data from the 
two most recent years given and used constant interval change to estimate the designated years. The y axis data 
comes from the researcher’s self-produced virtual water estimates. 
 indicates a positive relationship (r-squared 0.36) between the two variables. The 
research question that gives basis to this graph is the following: What is the relationship between 
domestic water withdrawal and virtual water import? Are the countries with higher levels of domestic 
water withdrawal likely to have higher or lower levels of virtual water import? If it is the case that 
countries with higher levels of domestic water withdrawal have lower levels of virtual water import, or 
similarly, countries with lower levels of domestic water withdrawal have higher levels of virtual water 
import, it can by hypothesized that virtual water acts as a tool to cover overall water consumption and 
alleviate water withdrawal from stressed domestic resources. This being said, the graph indicates 
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otherwise. The positive correlation between domestic water withdrawal and virtual water import is best 
explained by the overall rise of virtual water demandin the region. 
The relationship is thus most like corollary and not causal. As virtual water demand increases at 
large, both domestic water withdrawal and virtual water import rise to meet it. As factors in the region, 
most notably robust population growth, lead to greater water consumption among all sectors, on a country 
by country basis, virtual water import assists in meeting this demand. Graph 1 may indicate that overall 
virtual water demand (on a country by country basis) has reached a point such that virtual water import 
and domestic water withdrawal must rise together to meet it.  
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Graph 2—Virtual Water Import Per Capita vs. Renewable Domestic Water Resources Per Capita 
 
 
 As Graph 24
                                                          
4Graph 2 consists of 90 data points (18 country observations over 5 years: 2000 and 2008-2011). The x values for 
the data points above (renewable domestic water resources per capita) are produced via data from FAO’s 
AQUASTAT database. The researcher used the two most recent years provided by the database to estimate (via 
constant interval change) the years 5 years designated. The y values come from the researcher’s self-produced 
virtual water estimates. 
 indicates, the relationship between virtual water import per capita and renewable 
domestic water resources per capita shows a negative correlation (r-squared: 0.0.379). For countries with 
higher levels of water resources per capita, virtual water import per capita tends to be lower. Thus, a 
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decrease in water resources per capita corresponds to higher virtual water import. The researcher posits 
that this is due to the water depravity component of the virtual water import phenomenon: low levels of 
available domestic water resources induce virtual water import. While this correlation graph by no means 
proves such a causal relationship exists, it at the very least provides grounds to propose such a claim. 
Adding to the significance of this is the fact that water resources per capita in the MENA region 
are already notoriously low and declining rapidly. Per capita water share in the Arab world as a whole is 
1,000 cubic meters—substantially lower than the global average of 7,000 cubic meters, and is expected to 
fall to 500 cubic meters before 2025 (Dayem and Odeh, 2010, 172). Graph 2 above focuses on the MENA 
region—a contingency of countries that includes the Arab world along with non-Arab countries Iran and 
Israel—and estimates an average renewable domestic per capita water supply of 406 cubic meters for the 
region at large. The average virtual water import per capita, based on the graph, stands at 1121 cubic 
meters.  
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Graph 3—Virtual Water Import Per Capita vs. Agricultural Water Withdrawal as a Percentage of 
Renewable Water Resources (Agricultural Water Strain) 
 
 Graph 35
                                                          
5Graph 3 consists of only data for the years 2000 and 2010, thus there are substantially less data points than the other 
graphs. This is due to the fact that the x-variable was not part of the regression analysis and the researcher did not 
calculate values for all five years. Due to missing data, 26 of a possible 34 observations are used in the above graph 
(with Saudi Arabia excluded). 3 observations cannot be seen as their percentage is beyond 600. 
 reveals a positive correlation between virtual water import per capita and agricultural 
water strain. It should be noted that in the case of several countries, agricultural water withdrawal exceeds 
100 percent of renewable water resources, this can be explained by either extraction of water from non-
renewable aquifers or use of desalination (World Bank, 2011). The graph indicates that for the countries 
whose agricultural sectors strain domestic water resources, virtual water import per capita is generally 
higher. The explanation of robust population growth and rising food demand does not necessarily explain 
this correlation, as virtual water import is measured on a per capita basis. In other words, in the countries 
where people consume high levels of imported virtual water individually, agriculture’s strain on domestic 
water resources is also likely to be higher. The logic behind this relationship may be the following. As 
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countries increase stress on water resources via agricultural activity, their interest in importing 
agricultural commodities rises in conjunction.  The collective desire of MENA nations to import 
agricultural commodities—and the virtual water which constitute them—rises as they increasingly see the 
effect their own farming has on finite water resources. Virtual water import is thus a compensation 
mechanism countries are more inclined to take advantage of as domestic water scarcity becomes more 
desperate. 
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 Below is a breakdown of virtual water import for the MENA region at large over the 5 years 
assessed by the researcher (2000 and 2008-2011). 
Panel Dataset: Virtual Water Import Observations 
Total Virtual Water Import in the MENA Region (billions of cubic meters) 
2000 2008 2009 2010 2011 
147.93 271.28 273.58 309.89 307.72 
 
 The researcher acknowledges the peculiarity of the decrease in overall virtual water import for the 
MENA region at large between 2010 and 2011 (as is reported by the data). The reason for this is 
undoubtedly limited data for the 2011, particularly in the case of Saudi Arabia. Simply put, for some of 
the countries the virtual water estimation for 2011 does not include as many crops as is the case in other 
years. Virtual water import for the region as a whole roughly doubles in the 11 year span assessed by the 
researcher (increase of 108%). 
 Below is a chart highlighting averages (non-weighted) for the region over the 5 years assessed by 
the researcher: 
Virtual Water Import Averages for the MENA Region (billions of cubic meters) 
2000 2008 2009 2010 2011 
7.79 14.28 14.40 16.31 16.20 
 
 The lower average for 2011 vs. 2010 again is the result of missing data. The 16.20 billion cubic 
meter average for the region in 2011—given an average population for the region of 22.14 million in 
2011—is certainly high by global standards. Putting this in context of more official global water import 
figures (only available for the year 2000) one can see the relative magnitude of these virtual water 
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numbers. In the year 2000, Germany had a population of 82,211,508 (World Bank, 2013) and a virtual 
water import of 15.76 billion cubic meters (Hoekstra and Mekonnen, 2011).  Comparing Germany’s 
virtual water import figure to the almost equivalent 2011 MENA region virtual water import average of 
16.20 billion cubic meters with a  population average of only  22,141,980, one can see the 
disproportionality.  
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Aggregate Virtual Water Import: Country Rankings 
Billions of Cubic Meters 
(5 Years: 2000 and 2008-2011) 
Country Aggregate Virtual Water 
Import (billions of cubic 
meters) 
Population Rank 
Egypt 190.03 1 
Algeria 187.14 3 
Iran 163.53 2 
Morocco 113.20 4 
Saudi Arabia  97.79 6 
UAE 87.86 11 
Syria 74.55 8 
Yemen 70.17 7 
Israel 65.20 10 
Tunisia 61.41 9 
Iraq 56.71 5 
Libya 41.87 12 
Jordan 34.97 13 
Lebanon 24.20 14 
Kuwait 19.49 16 
Oman 12.32 15 
Qatar 5.49 17 
Bahrain 4.47 18 
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 It follows that virtual water import at large trends closely with total population due to the very 
basic causal relationship at play: more people to feed equals more water to import. Nonetheless, two 
countries stand out as having virtual water import figures disproportionate to their size.  
• The UAE with the region’s 11th largest population stands as the 6th largest virtual water importer. 
This may be explained by the high per capita income of its citizens and the subsequent ability to 
purchase large quantities of high water content food products. The GDP per capita calculations 
used in the research in some sense capture this purchasing power component of virtual water 
import. One notes that the UAE has the third highest GDP per capita in the region behind Kuwait 
and Qatar. 
 
• Iraq, with the region’s 5th largest population, ranks only 11th in virtual water import. While a 
reasonable explanation for this may be the Iraq War (2003-2011), it should be noted that in 
2000—before the war began—Iraq ranked even  lower at 11th for virtual water import in the 
region. Iraq’s notably low virtual water import--given its population—might best be explained by 
the country’s high amount of  renewable internal water resources. In 2011, Iraq’s supply of 
renewable internal water resources ranked third in the region behind those of Iran and Lebanon. 
In the case of Iraq, it thus seems to be that the lack of internal water scarcity contributes to the 
country’s low demand for virtual water import.  
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VII. Conclusions and Findings 
 This section attempts to clarify how the general conclusions reached during the testing and data 
analysis phases fit within the broader context of what is known regarding virtual water import. This 
research’s attempt to evaluate the causal relationship between the independent variables and virtual water 
import is important and challenging. Is it necessarily the case that the independent variables provided are 
causing virtual water import to increase, or are they simply increasing simultaneously alongside virtual 
water import, which itself is rising for reasons not charted? There are a few points worth mentioning 
regarding this crucial question. 
 It is possible for virtual water import and a variable like GDP to rise simultaneously without 
causality or even correlation existing; nonetheless, external evidence exists to support the notion that 
some relationship is at play. Looking at the issue globally, one common trend in the developed world is 
that numerous countries with plentiful supplies of domestic water resources still manage to have high 
levels of virtual water import. Canada, France, Russia, and the United States—among numerous others—
are water endowed nations that export large quantities of virtual water yet still maintain high levels of 
virtual water import (Mekkonen and Hoekstra, 2011, Appendix VI). This can be explained, at least in 
part, by the fact these nations are developed economically. Americans and Europeans consume high 
levels of virtual water because they desire and can afford large quantities of high water content foods. As 
GDP rises in the MENA region—albeit for the better—it is nonetheless reasonable to assume residents 
are will try to adopt these high water consumption habits practiced among the developed world.  
 The result seen in Model 10 regarding the relationship between renewable water resources and 
virtual water import is interesting given the parallel shown with the graphing and panel data observations. 
While the variable renewable water resources per capita cannot be measured statistically significant at any 
of the three levels selected, the negative coefficient does point to a relationship hypothesized in this 
research: higher levels of renewable water resources per capita work against the incentive to import 
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virtual water. This idea is further confirmed by the assessment of Iraq’s peculiarly large virtual water 
import, given its modest population. As noted in the data analysis section, Iraq has the MENA region’s 5th 
highest population but only 11th highest virtual water import. The researcher’s explanation for this is 
Iraq’s large supply of renewable domestic water resources—3rd largest in the region. In the case of Iraq, it 
would appear the country minimizes virtual water import via use of its abundant internal water resources. 
This said, the research still indicates that as a nation’s population and GDP rise, increase in virtual water 
import is inevitable, regardless of how favorable quantities of domestic water are. 
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VIII. Practical Implications and Policy Relevance 
One of the best reasons for categorizing rising virtual water import as a Catch-22 situation is that 
economic development is both its cause and solution. As renewable domestic water resources cannot be 
increased, only managed more efficiently, economic development is crucial to minimizing virtual water 
import dependency. More effective management of renewable domestic water resources is essential in 
reducing a nation’s need to import virtual water. Unfortunately, efficient water management is a daunting 
task that requires good governance practices, technical capabilities, and operational capacities (Stockholm 
International Water Institute, 2005, 4). Thus, the best water management is most likely to be found in the 
developed world. How then do MENA countries achieve the economic development necessary to allow 
them to most effectively manage their domestic water resources without incurring unrealistically high 
levels of virtual water import to get there? 
To begin, it is crucial MENA countries pursue efficient water management practices currently 
within reach. This includes steps such as small-scale technical capacity building with farmers; activities 
include rainwater harvesting, reuse of wastewater, and village level irrigation infrastructure (Ibid). In the 
case of both Morocco and Jordan, modernization of irrigation methods and technology is said to be 
responsible for a 70% increase in water use productivity (Abou-Hadid, 2010, 60). Moreover, governance 
and legislative reforms that improve water management can occur regardless of economic development or 
GDP growth. Practically speaking this can mean the reworking of water management legislation as well 
as the restructuring of water management authorities such that official water rules more accurately 
address reality (Ibid, 56). This can occur via a variety of means such as the creation of water use 
associations as well as the general decentralization of water regulation (Ibid, 59). Finally, more efficient 
water management can also take place via modification to existing farmer incentives. In the MENA 
region water authorities are becoming increasingly aware of how growing water scarcity and tighter 
budgets make the existing irrigation subsidies to agriculture unsustainable (Ibid, 57). This in mind, 
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alternative methods for incentivizing better water management among farmers include financial tools like 
tax cuts and rebates that promote the growth of low water content crops, as well as water conscious crop 
growth patterns (Ibid). 
The second crucial component in mitigating rising virtual water import in the MENA region is 
diet. That most people in the world today remain unaware that most of the water they consume comes 
from the food they eat is evidence to the fact that diet remains the lost component of global water 
management. As population and purchasing power in the MENA region rise, diet will take on increasing 
significance in the water scarcity discussion. From a policy perspective, there are several practical actions 
governments can take to shift dietary practices in favor of lower water consumption. Financial tools such 
as subsidies and rebates can be used to promote the success of low water content commodities in the food 
market. Additionally, water-nutrient ratios can be included on the labels of food products as standard 
information. 
It is important to note that the research herein does not make the policy suggestion that virtual 
water import is undesirable. As growth occurs in the region, virtual water import must rise. However, the 
extent of this virtual water import increase can be minimized via successful domestic water management 
and conscientious dietary practices. The graphical illustration of this concept can be found below. 
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Circle 1: The circle as a whole represents total virtual water 
consumption via food. The ¾ black section represents the 
portion of this consumption covered by virtual water import, 
the ¼ section representing the consumption of domestic 
water in its virtual form. 
Circle 2: As virtual water consumption increases the circle 
expands. Domestic water resources remain constant, thus the 
white area of Circle 1 remains the same in Circle 2, now 
representing a smaller portion of overall virtual water 
consumption. Virtual water import increases in quantity as 
well as proportionally to compensate. A higher percentage of 
virtual water consumption is now covered by import.  
Circle 3: Reduction of per capita virtual water consumption via 
dietary changes counteracts rising virtual water consumption. 
The size of the overall circle remains the same. Virtual water 
import remains unchanged; the same amount of domestic 
water covers overall virtual water consumption.  
Additionally, improved domestic water management has the 
ability to keep the circle from expanding. As agricultural 
practices achieve higher crop per drop ratios, total virtual 
water consumption remains the same despite increased food 
consumption. 
Given the rapid rise in virtual water consumption over recent 
years in the region, the researcher does not expect Circle 3 to 
be achievable in practice, but it represents the positive effect 
both diet and water management can have on reducing virtual 
water consumption at large, and virtual water import 
specifically. 
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IV. Conclusion 
 Virtual water concept founder and largest advocate, Tony Allan, describes the significance of the 
virtual water issue in the modern world by stating simply, “It can’t be reiterated enough: most of the 
water you use comes through your food consumption” (Ibid, 2011, 6). Unfortunately, the impact of public 
apathy towards this fact will not be distributed equally among the citizens of the world in future decades. 
It’s clear that the world’s most water scarce regions are likely to bear the largest burden of increasing 
global water scarcity.Future decades will see virtual water trade become increasingly characterized by 
less supply and higher demand. The MENA region is therefore the geographical starting point for the 
virtual water trade discussion. The dependency of the region’s countries on virtual water import is 
unmatched. 
 While virtual water import via food commodities has sustained the region for decades, it cannot 
be assumed that region will always be able to remain a beneficiary of global water trade. This in mind, the 
region must prioritize how it can get more out of its domestic water resources to stave off unsustainably 
high levels of virtual water import dependency.  This thesis attempts to contribute to this cause by putting 
forth estimates as to how much virtual water is increasing and the extent to which this increase is the 
result of predictable factors such as population and GDP.   
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